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## UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

21 June 1960

Agreed Guidance for the Implementation of the Presidential Directive  
on Disclosures of Classified Intelligence

For the purpose of providing guidance in the implementation of the Presidential Directive, the following is agreed upon by the U. S. Intelligence Board. To the extent applicable, this agreed guidance should be incorporated in any regulations or instructions issued in the implementation of the Presidential Directive.

1. The President, in his Directive to the addressee departments and agencies concerned, expresses his concern over the serious damage caused to national security and the harm that has been done to the intelligence effort through the appearance in public information media of classified intelligence tending to reveal intelligence sources and methods. The President directs that immediate action be taken to prevent the disclosure of classified intelligence except to properly authorized recipients. Further, in summarization the President directs certain other actions that:

a. Disclosures shall be made solely in consonance with applicable statutes and regulations.

b. Existing procedures for controlling classified intelligence shall be reviewed and corrective action taken where inadequacies are found.

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c. A continuing review shall be made of the dissemination of classified intelligence to ensure that it is confined to authorized recipients on a strict need-to-know basis.

d. The appropriate Intelligence Chief shall assess the risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods when release outside of authorized channels is considered.

e. Recipients of classified intelligence shall be made aware of the damage to intelligence sources and methods through improper disclosure actions.

The President also requires the assurance of the issuance of proper guidance in the implementation of his Directive and that he be informed of developments under this Directive together with appropriate recommendations.

2. The intent of the Presidential Directive is to ensure a greater degree of protection to all classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods and prevent unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence information. The results desired by the President can be obtained by strict compliance with applicable controls, statutes and regulations together with careful and continuing review to ensure their adequacy. Further, the proposed disclosure of classified intelligence outside of authorized channels shall be carefully assessed. Of special concern, as a background to this Directive, is the fact that the most damaging disclosures of classified intelligence in the past several

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years have involved vital intelligence sources and methods having a direct bearing on the national security. This classified intelligence has been disseminated officially in channels protected by authorized code words or project designators to those officials having an established need-to-know and properly authorized to receive such information. It is in this area of intelligence dissemination that greater emphasis is needed in indoctrinating all recipients of the detrimental effects of unauthorized disclosures and the requirements for strict compliance with controls governing such information.

3. This guidance is in addition to and does not supersede existing special controls governing the handling of such sensitive intelligence as communications intelligence, code word and certain project designated intelligence. As a matter of policy, only under the most exceptional circumstances should classified intelligence involving sensitive sources and methods be considered for release to the public.

4. The guidance contained in this paper is applicable to all classified intelligence. Certain classified intelligence, due to its sensitive nature, requires special controls. The term "sensitive intelligence" as used in this paper is defined as that classified intelligence which contains information, or which tends to reveal sources or methods, requiring special controls upon its dissemination because its disclosure could lead to counteraction (1) jeopardizing the continued productivity of intelligence sources or methods which provide intelligence

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vital to the national security or (2) offsetting the value of intelligence vital to the national security. Sensitive intelligence within the meaning of the foregoing should be identified by (1) code words authorized for such use, (2) project designators, (3) the marking "WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED," or (4) any combination thereof.

5. Departmental and agency regulations should include control and review procedures establishing the responsibility of the Intelligence Chief for the assessment of the risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved when dissemination of classified intelligence is contemplated outside of authorized channels, including releases to the public. Such control and review procedures should include:

a. Disclosure and Release Control:

(1) A review by intelligence authorities of any classified intelligence proposed for declassification or for use or disclosure in background briefings, symposiums, seminars, speeches, writings for publication, presentations, courses of instruction, press releases, formal and informal interviews with press representatives, and other aspects of public relation activities whereby intelligence sources and methods may be revealed. A record should be maintained of any classified intelligence declassified or authorized for disclosure and

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should contain the name of the individual who authorized such action.

(2) Classified intelligence inadvertently discussed with or disclosed to any person or persons not authorized for access to such intelligence should be made a matter of record by the responsible official and reported to the appropriate Intelligence Chief.

(3) Any person having knowledge of any disclosure of classified intelligence made not in accordance with the provisions of the regulations and controls of the department or agency concerned should promptly report it to the appropriate Intelligence Chief for action. Such action may include (a) such steps as are feasible to repair or limit the extent of the damage, (b) a request for investigation by appropriate authorities, (c) an assessment of the possible harm to intelligence sources and methods and notification to intelligence authorities concerned and (d) prompt notification to all official recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred together with advice of remedial action to be taken and guidance for responses to inquiries from public media representatives that may result from the compromise.

(4) Existing procedures for the control and release of classified intelligence should be reviewed and revised in light

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of the foregoing and should be supplemented by appropriate enforcement provisions. In particular, such procedures should include provisions whereby recipients of sensitive intelligence may determine whether or not individuals with whom they are in contact are authorized to receive such intelligence.

b. Disclosure and Release Techniques:

(1) Each Intelligence Chief should establish procedures for the assessment of risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved in any proposed dissemination of classified intelligence outside of authorized channels.

(2) Release procedures should include in the assessment of the risks those ways and means by which an attempt may be made to sanitize intelligence sources and methods.

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(3) Sensitive intelligence disclosed in official briefings and budgetary reports should be clearly identified from other information utilized in such briefings, and the recipients cautioned when appropriate, of the harmful effects to national security by disclosure of the information to unauthorized recipients. Similar measures should be employed, when appropriate in disclosing sensitive intelligence to those Government officials who deal with public media and who cannot readily be expected to know the origin of all information with which they are dealing.

(4) The proposed release of classified intelligence derived from a joint or combined project of the intelligence community should consider the interests of other intelligence community members participating in the intelligence project.

(5) If a department or agency authorizes the disclosure of sensitive intelligence for any of the purposes set forth in paragraph 5. a. (1), that department or agency is responsible to inform the other members of the USIB of that action together with any sanitized version thereof prepared in accordance with paragraph 5. b. (2).

6. Each department and agency should develop a continuing educational program for all recipients of classified intelligence concerning the damage that can accrue to intelligence sources and methods through

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the improper disclosure of such intelligence. Such a program may include where appropriate (1) specific instances of known unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence involving sensitive sources and methods, (2) an assessment of the possible harm resulting from such disclosures and (3) examples of the countermeasures that might be taken by foreign intelligence services to negate the information or the sources and methods involved.

7. Current practices for the dissemination of classified intelligence, particularly sensitive intelligence, should be reviewed and revised where necessary in order to ensure protection to intelligence sources and methods. Such should include but not be limited to:

a. Reviewing on a continuing basis the dissemination of classified intelligence with a view to ensuring that such dissemination is confined to authorized recipients on a strict need-to-know basis.

b. Marking of intelligence. When disseminated in bulletins, briefs, and similar documents, sensitive intelligence should be marked to distinguish it clearly from other information normally printed in such documents.

8. Addressees shall consider the need for additional legislation as well as other means to ensure the proper protection of the U. S. intelligence effort.

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